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Abstract
This article studies a new class of models which synthesize the two
traditions of general equilibrium with nonclearing markets and im-
perfect competition on the one hand, and dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models on the other hand. This line of models
has become a central paradigm of modern macroeconomics for at least
three reasons: (a) it displays solid microeconomic foundations, (b) it is
a highly synthetic theory, which combines in a unified framework gen-
eral equilibrium, nonclearing markets, imperfect competition, growth
theory and rational expectations, (c) it is also an empirical success,
leading to substantial progess towards matching real world statistics.
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This article studies a new class of models which synthesize the two tradi-
tions of general equilibrium with nonclearing markets and imperfect compe-
tition on the one hand, and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models on the other hand. Although this line of models is still recent, it has
clearly become in a short time a central paradigm of modern macroeconomics.
The reasons are at least threefold.
The first is that it displays solid microeconomic foundations. This is
quite natural since from the two constituent fields above this one inherited a
strong general equilibrium framework where all agents (households or firms)
maximize their respective objectives subject to well defined constraints.
The second is that it is a highly synthetic theory, which combines in a
unified framework general equilibrium, nonclearing markets, imperfect com-
petition, growth theory and rational expectations, so that it can appeal to
macroeconomists with very diﬀerent backgrounds.
The third reason is empirical. A key motivation for DSGE models is
to compare the “statistics” generated by these models with the real world
ones. In that respect the addition of nonclearing markets and imperfect
competition has led to substantial progress in matching these statistics, and
this has certainly been an important factor in the success of these models.
Now such a wide synthesis did not come all at once. So we shall begin by
recalling briefly a little history and some of the antecedents of the field.
We then present a series of models with explicit solutions. These will
demonstrate analytically how the introduction of non clearing markets al-
lows to substantially improve the ability of DSGE to reproduce a number of
macroeconomic facts.
1 History
1.1 Early times
At the time when many of the developments leading to these models were
initiated, there was a profound split between microeconomics and macroeco-
nomics. On the one hand microeconomics, in its general equilibrium version,
was dominated by Walras’ (1874) model, as developed by Arrow-Debreu
(1954), Arrow (1963), and Debreu (1959). In these models all adjustments
are carried out via fully flexible prices, and agents never experience any quan-
tity constraint. On the other hand in the standard macroeconomic model in
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the Keynes (1936) and Hicks (1937) tradition, as exemplified by the IS-LM
model, there are price and wage rigidities, unemployment is present and most
adjustments are carried out through variations in real income, a quantity, not
a price.
Confronted with this inconsistency, the strategies of macroeconomists
turned out to be quite diverse and they took two diﬀerent routes.
1.2 General equilibrium with nonclearing markets
On the one hand a first set of authors aimed at achieving a synthesis between
the then existing microeconomics and macroeconomics. This was achieved
by generalizing the traditional general equilibrium model, by introducing
nonclearing markets, introducing quantity signals into demand and supply
functions, and endogenizing prices in a framework of imperfect competition.
Patinkin (1956) and Clower (1965) showed that the presence of quantity
constraints in nonclearing markets would drastically modify the demands
for labor and goods, an insight further emphasized by Leijonhufvud (1968).
Barro and Grossman (1971, 1976) combined these insights into a fixprice
macromodel. Drèze (1975) and Bénassy (1975, 1982) constructed full general
equilibrium concepts with price rigidities, where price movements are par-
tially replaced by endogenous quantity constraints. Bénassy (1976) linked
these concepts with general equilibrium under imperfect competition à la
Negishi (1961). This link was furthered with the construction of a full general
equilibrium concept of objective demand curve based on quantity constraints
(Bénassy 1988. See also Gabszewicz and Vial, 1972, for a Cournotian view).
All these developments are reviewed in the dictionary entry “Nonclearing
markets in general equilibrium”.
1.3 Dynamic market clearing macroeconomics
A second set of authors achieved consistency between microeconomics and
macroeconomics by importing into macroeconomics the basic assumption of
the then dominant general equilibrium microeconomic models, market clear-
ing. At the same time they paid strong attention to the issues of dynamics
and expectations. A central part of these developments was the use of “ratio-
nal expectations” in the sense of Muth (1961). This was an important addi-
tion, as in the Keynesian system it was sometimes diﬃcult to disentangle the
results due to price or wage rigidity from those due to incorrect expectations.
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Rational expectations allowed the suppression of the second type of results.
It appeared also that, even with rational expectations and market clearing,
it was possible to build rigorous models displaying fluctuations (Lucas, 1972,
Kydland and Prescott, 1982, Long and Plosser, 1983).
1.4 Non Walrasian cycles
Starting in the mid-eighties authors began combining elements of the two
paradigms described above, achieving the synthesis that is the subject of
this article. Svensson (1986) studies a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
monetary economy subject to supply and demand shocks. Prices are preset
one period in advance by monopolistically competitive firms, so we have
both imperfect competition and sticky prices. Because of price presetting
the model has multiple regimes.
Various types of rigidities have been then introduced in dynamic models,
leading to diﬀerent patterns of cycles. Andersen (1994) reviews various causes
and consequences of price and wage rigidities.
A first type of rigidities is “real” rigidities, which create an endogenous
noncompetitive wedge between various prices. As an example, monopo-
listic competition à la Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) introduces a markup between
marginal cost and price. In this class Danthine and Donaldson (1990) in-
troduce eﬃciency wages, Danthine and Donaldson (1991, 1992) introduce
implicit contracts in the vein of Azariadis (1975), Baily (1974) and Gordon
(1974). Rotemberg and Woodford (1992, 1995) study imperfect competition.
Models with nominal rigidities study situations where the nominal prices
themselves (and not relative prices) are sluggish. Several devices have been
used. The first, following the early works on wage and price contracts by
Gray (1976), Fischer (1977), Phelps and Taylor (1977), Taylor (1979, 1980)
and Calvo (1983), assumes that there is a system of contracts expiring at
deterministic or stochastic dates. For that reason they are called ‘time de-
pendent”. Such contracts have been integrated in DSGE models by Cho
(1993), Cho and Cooley (1995), Bénassy (1995, 2002, 2003a,b), Yun (1996),
Cho, Cooley and Phaneuf (1997), Andersen (1998), Jeanne (1998), Ascari
(2000), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000), Collard and Ertz (2000), As-
cari and Rankin (2002), Huang and Liu (2002), Smets and Wouters (2003)
and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), to name only a few.
Another type of price rigidity, called “state dependent”, is based on costs
of changing prices. Two specifications are favorite in the literature: quadratic
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costs of changing prices (Rotemberg, 1982a,b), which have been implemented,
for example, in Hairault and Portier (1993), and fixed costs of changing prices
(Barro, 1972), often renamed “menu costs”. Clearly these costs should be
interpreted as surrogates for other unspecified causes, and identifying these
causes is a challenge that faces this line of research.
Now most of the contributions of this field are based on numerical evalu-
ations of various models. So we shall present next a number of models with
explicit solutions which will make clear why this line of models has been
successful in solving problems that were diﬃcult to solve in market clearing
models.
2 An analytical illustration
We shall now show in this section in a series of explicitly solved models how
the introduction of nominal rigidities in DSGE models allows to considerably
improve the capacities of these models to reproduce the dynamic evolutions
of actual economies.
We first present a basic model and compute as a reference its Walrasian
equilibrium and dynamics. Then we introduce a first nominal rigidity, one-
period wage contracts. This improves some correlations, but cannot create
strong persistence as in reality. We next introduce multiperiodic wage con-
tracts, and show that this allows to obtain a persistent response of output
to demand shocks. Finally simultaneous rigidities of wages and prices are
considered, and we show that one can obtain in this way with fairly realis-
tic values of the parameters a persistent and humpshaped response of both
output and inflation.
2.1 The basic model
We shall study a dynamic monetary economy à la Sidrauski (1967) and Brock
(1975), where goods are exchanged against money at the (average) price Pt
and work against money at the (average) wage Wt. There are two types of
agents: households and firms. Firms have a simple technology:
Yt = ZtN
α
t (1)
where Nt is the quantity of labor used by firms and Zt a technological shock
common to all firms. Note that we do not introduce capital in this model.
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Because its rate of depreciation is low, it would not add much to our argu-
ment, and would substantially complicate the results and exposition.
The representative household works Nt, consumes Ct, and ends period t
with a quantity of moneyMt. It maximizes the expectation of its discounted
utility:
U = E0
∞X
t=0
βt
·
log Ct + ω log
Mt
Pt
− ξN
ν
t
ν
¸
(2)
At the beginning of period t the household faces a monetary shock à la
Lucas (1972), whereby the quantity of money Mt−1 coming from t − 1 is
multiplied by µt, so that its budget constraint for period t is:
Ct +
Mt
Pt
=
Wt
Pt
Nt +
µtMt−1
Pt
(3)
There are thus two shocks in this economy, the technology shock Zt and
the monetary shock µt =Mt/Mt−1. As an illustration we shall use below the
following traditional processes (in all that follows lowercase letters represent
the logarithm of the variable represented by the corresponding uppercase
letter):
mt −mt−1 =
εmt
1− ρL zt =
εzt
1− ϕL (4)
where εzt and εmt, the innovations in zt andmt, are uncorrelated white noises
with:
var(εzt) = σ2z var(εmt) = σ
2
m (5)
2.2 Walrasian dynamics
As a benchmark we shall first study here the case where both labour and
goods markets are in Walrasian equilibrium in each period, as in the first
traditional RBC (real business cycles) models, and we shall see how this
economy reacts to technological and monetary shocks. Solving the model we
find that money holdings are a multiple of consumption:
Mt
PtCt
=
ω
1− β (6)
and that employment Nt is constant:
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Nt = N = (α/ξ)
1/ν (7)
Using (1) and (7) we find (we eliminate some irrelevant constant terms):
nt = n yt = zt + αn wt − pt = yt − n (8)
Although we will not do any real calibration in this article, we can note
at this stage a few issues that posed a problem to researchers in the RBC
domain.
First, real wages are much too procyclical in this Walrasian model. From
(8) we see that the real wage-output correlation is equal to 1. Eventhough
this correlation is lower than 1 in calibrated models where Nt varies, it is
always quite above what is observed in real economies.
A second problem concerns the inflation-output correlation, a problem
related to the literature on the Phillips curve. Whereas it is generally con-
sidered that this correlation is positive, the above Walrasian model yields a
negative correlation:
cov (∆pt, yt) = −
σ2z
1 + ϕ
< 0 (9)
Finally an important and recurrent critique of RBC type models has
been that they do not generate any internal propagation mechanism, and
that the only persistence in output movements is that already present in the
exogenous process of technological shocks zt (see, for example, Cogley and
Nason, 1993, 1995). This appears here in equation (8) where the dynamics
of output yt is exactly the same as that of the technological shock zt.
We shall now introduce wage contracts, first lasting one period, and then
multiperiod overlapping contracts, and we shall see that the above problems
find a natural solution in this framework.
2.3 Single period wage contracts
Let us thus assume (Bénassy, 1995, and Bénassy, 2002 for microfoundations),
that the wages are predetermined at the beginning of each period at the ex-
pected value of the Walrasian wage (in logarithms), and that at this contrac-
tual wage the households supply the quantity of work demanded by firms
(this type of contracts was introduced by Gray, 1976).
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Combining (6) and Ct = Yt we find that the Walrasian wage w∗t is, up to
an unimportant constant, equal to mt, so that the preset wage wt is given
by:
wt = Et−1w
∗
t = Et−1mt (10)
where Et−1mt is the expectation of mt formed at the beginning of period t,
before shocks are known.
The diﬀerence with the Walrasian case is that employment Nt is now
variable and demand determined. Equations (8) become:
yt = zt + αnt wt − pt = yt − nt (11)
while nt = n is replaced by (10). So we first obtain the level of employment
in period t:
nt = n+mt −Et−1mt = n+ εmt (12)
since mt − Et−1mt = εmt. Contrarily to what happened in the Walrasian
version of the model, unanticipated monetary shocks now have an impact
on the level of employment, and therefore output. We shall now use the
preceding formulas to show that the hypothesis of preset wages allows to
substantially improve some correlations relative to the Walrasian model.
Let us start with the real wage which, in the Walrasian model, has a much
too high positive correlation with output. Let us combine (11) and (12), to
obtain the values of output and real wage:
yt = zt + αεmt wt − pt = zt − (1− α) εmt (13)
We see that supply shocks create a positive correlation between the real
wage and output. However monetary shocks create a negative correlation.
Our model thus allows us to combine this last characteristic, typical of tra-
ditional Keynesians models, with the usual results of RBC models. If one
considers the technological and monetary shocks (4), one obtains the follow-
ing correlation:
corr(wt − pt, yt) =
σ2z − (1− ϕ2)α(1− α)σ2m
[(σ2z + (1− ϕ2)α2σ2m)]
1/2 [σ2z + (1− ϕ2) (1− α)2σ2m]1/2
(14)
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We see that the real-wage-output correlation is equal to 1 if there are only
technological shocks. But this correlation diminishes as soon as there are
monetary shocks, and it can even become negative. One can thus reproduce
the correlations observed in reality by adequate combinations of technological
and monetary shocks.
Let us now consider the relation between inflation and output, which
are generally considered to be positively correlated, at least in Keynesian
tradition. If we assume again the monetary and technological shocks (4), we
find:
Covariance (∆pt, yt) = α (1− α)σ2m −
σ2z
1 + ϕ
(15)
Formula (15) shows us that the positive covariance (and thus correlation)
between inflation and output is linked to the presence of demand shocks, and
that the sign of this correlation may change if there are suﬃciently strong
technological shocks.
So we just saw that one-period contracts allow us to improve some im-
portant correlations. We shall now naturally ask a question already posed
for the standard RBC model: Is the response to shocks, and in particular to
demand shocks, suﬃciently persistent? Let us recall equation (13):
yt = zt + αεmt (16)
We see that monetary shocks now have an immediate eﬀect on output
(and employment), but that, starting with the second period, the eﬀect of
these shocks is completely dampened. One period contracts allow us to
solve the puzzle raised by some correlations, but certainly not the persistence
problem. We shall see in the next two sections that multiperiodic contracts
allow us to solve that problem.
2.4 Multiperiodic wage contracts
The models that we have examined so far share with traditional RBC mod-
els the defect of having an extremely weak internal propagation mechanism.
In particular the response of output to monetary demand shocks is almost
entirely transitory. But several empirical studies (see, for example, Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1999, 2005) have pointed out that in reality
the response to monetary shocks not only was persistent, but also had a
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hump-shaped response function. We shall now introduce multiperiodic wage
contracts in rigorous stochastic dynamic models, and show that they allow
to reproduce these features. Models with such multiperiodic wage or price
contracts have been studied notably by Yun (1996), Andersen (1998), Jeanne
(1998), Ascari (2000), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000), Collard and Ertz
(2000) and . .Bénassy (2002, 2003a,b).
In order to make our demonstration analytically, we shall use a contract,
inspired by Calvo (1983) and developed in Bénassy (2002, 2003a), which has
three advantages: (a) the average duration of contracts can take any value
from zero to infinity, (b) an analytical solution can be found with both wage
and price contracts, (c) it has explicit microfoundations.
In this framework in each period s a contract is made for wages at period
t ≥ s. As in the Gray contract the contract wage is the expectation of the
market clearing wage in period t. So if we denote as xst the contract wage
made in s for period t:
xst = Es (w
∗
t ) (17)
Now, as in Calvo (1983), each wage contract has a probability γ to stay
unchanged, and a probability 1− γ to be broken. If the contract is broken,
a new contract is immediately renegotiated on the basis of current period
information. So for γ = 0, wages are totally flexible, for γ = 1 they are
totally rigid.
It is easy to compute the average duration of these contracts. The proba-
bility for a contract to be still valid j periods after the date it was concluded
is equal to (1− γ) γj. The expected duration of the contract is thus:
∞X
j=0
(1− γ) jγj = γ
1− γ (18)
We thus see that varying γ from 0 to 1 the average duration of the contract
varies from zero to infinity.
The average wage wt is the mean of past xst’s weighted by the probability
for the corresponding contract to be still in eﬀect. Because of the law of large
numbers, and since the probability of survival of wage contracts is γ, the
proportion of contracts coming from period s ≤ t is (1− γ) γt−s. Therefore
the average wage in the economy is given by:
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wt = (1− γ)
tX
s=−∞
γt−sxst (19)
If we now solve the model with the shocks (4) we find that the dynamics
of employment is characterized by (Bénassy, 2002, 2003a):
nt = n+
γεmt
(1− γL) (1− γρL) (20)
where L is the lag operator: LjXt = Xt−j. The response of output is deduced
from that of employment through:
yt = αnt + zt (21)
Formula (20) shows clearly that, contrarily to the case of one period
contracts, the response to a monetary shock can be quite persistent. We
can have an idea of the temporal profile of this response by computing the
response function of output and employment to a monetary shock. The
value of ρ most often found in the literature is ρ = 0.5. As for γ, we saw
above (formula 18) that the average duration of wage contracts is equal
to γ/ (1− γ). One considers generally that the average duration of wage
contracts is about one year (see for example Taylor, 1999), which corresponds
to γ = 4/5. Figure 1 shows the response of employment (output is derived
via 21) to a monetary shock for γ = 4/5.
Figure 1
We see that the response function displays persistence in the eﬀects of
monetary shocks, and has even a hump shaped response. If we plot, however,
the response function of inflation, we find that it is steadily decreasing after
the initial jump, whereas it seems to have a delayed hump shaped response
in reality.
2.5 Wage and price multiperiodic contracts
We shall now enlarge our model by considering simultaneously wage and
price multiperiodic contracts (see Bénassy, 2003b, for such a model with
explicit microfoundations). Numerically solved models with both wage and
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price multiperiodic contracts are found in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(2005), Huang and Liu (2002), Smets and Wouters (2003).
Wage contracts are exactly the same as in the preceding section: each
contract is maintained with probability γ, or renegotiated with probability
1 − γ. Symmetrically price contracts are maintained with probability φ, or
break down and are renegotiated with probability 1− φ. The average price
pt is given by:
pt = (1− φ)
tX
s=−∞
φt−sqst (22)
where qst is the price contract negotiated in period s for period t. Using again
the shock processes (4), and taking ν = 1, we find the following dynamics
for output and inflation:
yt = zt −
φεzt
1− φϕL +
αγεmt
(1− γL) (1− γρL)
+
φεmt
(1− φL) (1− φρL) −
αγφεmt
(1− γφL) (1− γφρL) (23)
πt = (1− L) pt = (1− L) (mt − yt) (24)
As in the preceding section we shall take as an illustration α = 2/3,
ρ = 1/2 and γ = 4/5 (one year wage contracts). As for prices we want
to take a rather low duration of contracts, so we shall take φ = 1/2 (one
quarter). Simulations show that in that case we obtain a persistent and
humpshaped response for both output and inflation.
So we see that with only reasonable nominal rigidities we obtain some
realistic response functions. Clearly the adjunction of “real” rigidities would
allow to reproduce even better the actual dynamic macroeconomic patterns.
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